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Abstract  
The fundamental aim of this study is to examine the relationship that exit between board structure and firm 
performance of non-financial Ghanaian listed companies. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, unique 
data were collected from a sample of 28 non-financial  companies covering five financial year periods 2012-
2017 was used and thereafter analysis done within panel data framework/multiple linear regression framework. 
The variables such as CEO duality, CEO tenure, board size, board composition and its independence were 
considered as predictors of the firm performance that was measured employing accounting based performance 
measures such as the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and EPS. I found board size to have a 
positively significant relationship with firm performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance represents the channel and solution that manage the relationship between shareholders and 
the board of directors. As there is always an uncertainty factor represented by the shareholders of how the board 
of directors are directing the corporation they are interested in, and whether they are managing it in their favor or 
not. Again, because shareholders are always unaware of the management’s procedures or styles that are used by 
those directors, therefore there must be a solution that reduces the gap which exists between companies 
represented by the board of directors and interested parties such as shareholders; the solution is therefore 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Generally, it is accepted that corporate boards play a primary and essential 
role in corporate governance, the structure of the strategic dimensions of a company and originate goals 
(Agyemang & Castellini, 2015). Businesses all over the world require economic growth and developments to 
attract financiers. Investors, normally ensure that the businesses in question are financially stable, secured and 
possess the ability to generate profits in the long run before these investors put in their finances (Bhimani, 2008). 
Therefore, in situations where companies’ positions are not as promising as they may expect, it will make no 
economic sense for investors to invest in these businesses. However, the failure to attract enough capital will 
lead to negatives influences on the business and the economy in general. The economic well-being of every 
nation is accredited to the replication of the performance of its companies. Thus, low level of developments and 
economic growth in developing countries are attributed to poor performances of companies as a result of low 
level of corporate governance practices. In view of this, the World Bank, other international organizations and 
several writers have identified these countries as not having the capacity to manage their resources but to depend 
on the developed countries. Therefore, the emphasis placed on good corporate governance practices in the 
already existing literature as the most important problem facing the development of countries such as Ghana is 
worth acknowledged. However,  The relationship between board structure and firm performance has received 
much attention, most especially in developed countries like the US and UK and the developing countries, yet this 
has yielded many varying pragmatic results.(see(Saltaji, 2013),(Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, Fadzil, & Al-Matari, 
2012)(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010), (Daily & Dalton, 1994), (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003). Meanwhile, there is no consensus drawn as to what exactly the ideal board structure should be 
(Agyemang & Castellini, 2013). Again there is also an unsolidified controversy surrounding whether the board 
should be composed of mainly of “insiders or outsiders (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007), (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008). 
The agency theory argues that, board independence is important if it is effectively monitored by management 
team, and the insider dominated boards, by their nature, are not independent of management (Aryani, Setiawan, 
& Rahmawati, 2017). Additionally, the steward theory also argue that, inside directors are more effective 
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because they have more knowledge of the company operations than outside directors and are diligent as non-
executive directors, because of their legal responsibility and their interest in company (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; 
Zhang and Wang, 2013). However, following all the above revelations little research has been done on the 
subject in developing countries, and even less in Ghana, some few people have, namely, (Tsamenyi, Enninful-
Adu, & Onumah, 2007),(Bokpin & Arko, 2009) and a few others. Specifically, no study has yet been undertaken 
to examine the relationship that exit between board structure and the firm performance of non-financial listed 
companies on the Ghana stock exchange, in spite of the important contributions of the nonfinancial sector to the 
economy of Ghana. The importance of board of directors was spelt out by a study carried out by (Fama & Jensen, 
1983)who considered it as one of the main elements of governance; it was further evidenced by (Limpaphayom 
& Connelly, 2006) who also stressed on the need and the effective characteristics of the role of the board of 
directors in overseeing management. Boards become very essential for smooth functioning of organizations.  
Boards are expected to perform different functions, which includes monitoring of management to mitigate 
agency costs ((Eisenhardt, 1989); (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997); (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005), hiring and 
firing of management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998), provide and give access to resources (Hillman, Cannella, & 
Paetzold, 2000); (Hendry & Kiel, 2004), grooming CEO (Slocum, 2006) and providing strategic direction for the 
firm(Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). Boards also have a responsibility to initiate organizational changes and facilitate 
processes that support the organizational mission (Bart & Bontis, 2003). 
The agency theory establishes that, the agency relationship is a contract whereby the one or more 
person(principal) and engages another person (agent) to perform some service or a duty on their behalf, which 
involves delegating some decision –making authority to the agent(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).The theory 
postulate further, that, the inappropriateness of management or the agent in taking the best possible action for the 
public and the shareholder’s sake as the agents generally act in their own interest. The boards seek to protect 
shareholder’s interest in an increasingly competitive environment while maintaining managerial professionalism 
and accountability in pursuit of good firm performance(McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007). Therefore, Board 
structure as an element of corporate governance is defined by three variables: the number of directors, the 
relative proportion of outside and inside directors, and the separation of the functions of chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chairman of the board has an influence on the firm and its financial performance((Fama & Jensen, 
1983); (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001); (Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). 
The nonfinancial sector is an important component of the Ghanaian economy because of its numerous 
industrial compositions namely; Oil & Gas, Consumer Goods, Basic materials, Health care, Industries and 
Technology which serve several needs of the people in Ghana. Due to the peculiar characteristics and 
contributions of the nonfinancial sector to the development of the Ghanaian economy coupled with the non-
existing study on this subject, there is a cogent ground to conduct this research. This article is organized into five 
parts: the introduction, review of relevant literature, followed by the methodology, data analysis and model 
specification, results discussion and the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature 
It is generally argued that when firms have good governance systems, they exhibit better performance as 
compared to other firms. This study has enlarged the literature of prior studies that examined the relationship 
between corporate governance (board structure) and firm performance. There are several studies done in 
developed and developing countries (Al-Matari et al., 2012);(Hassan & Farouk, 2014)which examined the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. However, Corporate governance is underlined 
by several theories, these theories range from the agency theory and stretch to stewardship theory, stakeholder 
theory, resource dependency theory, transaction cost theory, political theory and ethics related theories like 
business ethics theory, virtue ethics theory, feminist`s ethics theory, disclosure theory and postmodernism ethics 
theory (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). 
Agency theory is one of the most famous corporate governance theories that show the corporate relationship 
with ownership. Agency theory its bases come from an economic theory exposited by (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972)and further developed by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is defined as “the relationship 
between the principals, such as shareholders and agents such as the company executives and managers”.  
In this theory, the owners whom are represented by the shareholders or the principals, employs the agents to 
work on their behalf. Principals delegate the management and running of business to the directors or managers, 
who are shareholder`s agents (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009).  
The other significant theory for this research is Resource Dependency Theory.  
Resource dependency theory focuses on the role of board of directors in giving an access to the needed 
resources by the firm, (Hillman et al., 2000) explain that resource dependency theory concentrates on the 
function of directors that play in providing and securing the needed resources to the organization through their 
communications with the external environment. 
All said and done , This chapter examines corporate governance practices in Ghana and a survey of the 
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literature pertaining to the topic; the Impact of board structure on Firm Performance as well as some theories and 
views of others who have previously studied into the subject will be examined. Most studies have examined the 
impact of the board characteristics (CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee, board size and composition of 
the Board) on firm performance. Hence this study will investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms namely, board size, board composition, CEO duality and CEO tenure with the firm’s performance. 
 
2.1 Independent Variables and Definitions 
2.1.1 Board Size and Corporate Performance: 
Theoretically, the relationship between board size and firm performance in general remains inconclusive 
(Weerakkodi, 2015). The finance literature has generally found evidence consistent with the agency theory 
perspective that a smaller board is related to better firm performance (Gertner & Kaplan, 1996); (Yermack, 
1996); (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998);(Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2005),(Denis & Sarin, 1999). Due to 
management costs and free rider problems inherent in large boards, shareholder groups generally favor smaller 
boards and have pressured companies to reduce board size (Gertner & Kaplan, 1996). For many years, empirical 
studies have tried to find the optimal size of a board of directors of a company. (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) argue 
that, the optimal size of the board of directors should be between seven and nine to ensure accountability, 
coordination, reduce free ridding problem and faster decision making which enhances performance. A level 
below ten is optimal; a smaller board works better and could be less manipulated by the delegated director. The 
relevant literature examined the relationship between board size and firm performance, the findings turned up to 
be inconclusive. In examining this relationship,(Shakir, 2008) found a negative relationship between board size 
and firm performance which supported the conclusion of (Conyon & Peck, 1998) that for a firm to be effective 
in its monitoring, it should have a relatively small board of directors. In relation to that, (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) 
argued that a large boards are seen as ineffective in monitoring performance and could also  cost more for 
companies in terms of compensation and increased incentives for them to avoid. The same conclusion was drawn 
by (Al-Matari et al., 2012) based on his study carried out on the Canadian public companies. His conclusion 
implies that the board size was also shown to have a negative relationship with performance measured by return 
on sales, sales efficiency and ROA. However, prior studies pertaining to the size of the board also supported the 
positive relationship between the size of the board of directors and corporate performance and these studies seem 
consistent with resource dependency theory, which supports a positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance (Riaz, Khan, & Shaheen, 2017); (De Andres & Vallelado, 2008). However, both theories support 
the notion that board size has a significant economic impact on firm value. Large boards are viewed to lead to a 
better business performance owing to the wide variety of skills present for better decision making and monitor 
the performance of the CEO. Moreover, (Rechner & Dalton, 1991) have also reported that large boards are 
associated with stronger performance. These results supported the conclusion made by (Pfeffer, 1972) and 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989)regarding the relationship between the board size and firm performance. Therefore, based 
on the theoretical perspective and discussions above, the first hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
2.1.2 Board Composition and Firm Performance 
Board composition has been highly debated in the fields of economics, organizational science literatures, and 
finance on the empirical and the theoretical frameworks .One of the key characteristics of a firm’s board is the 
blend of executive and non-executive directors which is very important for its performance. Non-executive 
directors are the ones(professional referees)  who are not involved in the day to day management of the firm, but 
are involved in the decision making and the planning policies. The proportion of directors would obviously to a 
large extend determine the quality of decision making since objectivity would play an important role, moreover, 
whether the board can objectively monitor and control the management. Previous studies by (Kaplan & Reishus, 
1990), (Byrd & Hickman, 1992),Therefore, a board is seen to be more independent if it has more non-executive 
directors (John & Senbet, 1998)(Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997), (Abor & Adjasi, 2007),(Khan & Awan, 2012) 
argued that there is a positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Also (Rashid, 
De Zoysa, Lodh, & Rudkin, 2010) documented that firms with independent directors have less agency problems 
and have more alignments to shareholders.  It has also been debated that, the effective ways of monitoring 
boards is by making executives function effectively to take care of the shareholder’s interests rather than their 
own (Al-Matari et al., 2012). According to agency theory, a larger proportion of independent directors generally 
provide better firm performance. It has been concluded by (Al-Matari et al., 2012) that the proportion of 
independent directors has an effect on firm performance. Previous studies examining the relationship between 
board composition and firm performance have been inconsistent. Whilst some studies found that firms with 
board of directors dominated by outsiders are able to perform better (Adams & Mehran, 2005),(John & Senbet, 
1998; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006)and supported by (Wang & Coffey, 1992)who also found out that, 
there is a positive association between the proportion of outside board members and performance.  Others studies 
such as (Bhagat & Black, 1999);(Kajola, 2008); (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991); (Zahra & Pearce, 1989); (Daily 
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& Dalton, 1992); (Pearce & Zahra, 1992); (Baysinger & Butler, 1985)) Arguably supported the premises of the 
agency theory. (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991) and (Bhagat & Black, 2001), (Mura, 2007)found there is no 
relation between the degree of board independence and four measures of firm performance. Based on the 
theoretical perspective and discussion above, the following hypothesis was to be tested:  
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
2.1.3 CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
One aspect of corporate governance, which has given rise to concern, is the personality phenomenon which 
involves role duality. One important function of the board of directors is to monitor the top management`s 
actions, but a problem may arise when the Chief Executive Officer and chairperson positions are held by the 
same person. CEO duality is an important governance mechanism due to its sensitive nature of the relationship 
between agents and principals(Tian & Lau, 2001); (Krause & Bruton, 2014). Agency theory suggests that CEO’s 
should run the firm in the best interest of shareholders((Brickley et al., 1997); (Mishra & Mohanty, 2014). 
Agency Theory shows that great conflicts may arise from the action of duality. (Blackburn, 1994; Dahya, Lonie, 
& Power, 1996), Argue that combining the two roles may undermine the board’s monitoring power, but 
Stewardship Theory supports the idea. Stewardship is one of the most important theories of Corporate 
Governance which states that managers don’t work for their self-interest but they are working for the corporation 
favor, as they are steward for corporation assets. Managers are working for making high reputation for them and 
so it benefits the corporation. 
CEO non-duality leads to better performance than CEO duality (Brickley et al., 1997); (Ramdani & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2009).(Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010) argued that CEO duality plays an important role in 
affecting the value of a firm. A single person being the Chairman and the CEO leads to the enhancement of the 
firm’s value and the cost is minimized. This is supported by (Rechner & Dalton, 1991)who argued that a 
combined leadership helps in monitoring the activities of top management and thus decreases the agency costs. 
However, (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996) indicate that CEO duality can lead to the board’s worse performance as 
the board is unable to fire under or nonperforming CEO which can generate agency costs in cases where the 
CEO works for his own interest as opposed to the shareholders. (Yan Lam & Kam Lee, 2008),(Yusoff & Alhaji, 
2012)argue that, when the CEO and board chair positions are separate, it increases the firm’s value. (Brickley et 
al., 1997) argue that CEO duality in a firm favours the under or nonperforming CEO as it is difficult for the 
board to remove him. Based on the previous arguments and other supporting ones, it is reasonable to test the 
following hypothesized relationship: 
H3: There is a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
2.1.4 CEO Tenure and Firm Performance: 
This is how long a CEO served in that position before he or she is removal or resignation from office. All other 
things being equal, the longer a CEO stays in office the better the corporate performance. This is because the 
CEO as the head of the executive needs job security to be able to take decisions that would enhance firm 
performance. In this regard, longer tenure is expected to have a positive influence on performance, although 
some studies have revealed that long serving CEOs resort to building an empire rather than focusing of 
productivity. However, some studies conducted to investigate the relationship between CEOs tenure and firm 
performances found mixed results. Example, (Kyereboah‐Coleman, 2007) found that there is negative 
relationship between CEO tenure and Ghana firms' performance. Performance-related turnovers are clearly 
observed in cases where the CEO left before retirement. Simply put, the shorter the CEO’s tenure in office, the 
poorer is his performance and vice versa. Contrary, in an earlier study carried out by (Hill & Phan, 1991), it was 
found that there is no significant relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance. Thus it is meaningful 
to test the relationship postulated in the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance. 
The study also considered the effect of two control variables namely, firm size and leverage, when 
investigating the corporate board characteristics and firm performance relationship. The two variables are as 
follows and briefly described.  
2.1.5 Firm Size 
Using firm size as the control variable in this study is motivated by the fact that it has been found to be 
associated with companies with different characteristics. (Cheng, Evans, & Nagarajan, 2008) argued firm size 
and growth are important determinants of the size and structure of the boards. They found that firm size is 
directly related to the size and inversely proportional to the proxy for growth opportunities, that insider 
representation is inversely proportional to firm size and directly related to the proxy for opportunities growth and 
thus, a firm size has an effect on the firm performance.  
2.1.6 Leverage 
Leverage has been widely used as a control variable by a number of empirical studies (such as (Kyereboah-
Coleman & Biekpe, 2006);(Alsaeed, 2006)that have examined the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance of the company. In their attempt to justify taking the leverage as a control variable, 
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these studies have revealed that the debt has an effect on the financial performance of the company. As 
suggested by (Alsaeed, 2006), the firm leverage was measured by dividing total of liabilities by the total of 
assets. In the light of the above discussion, Table 1 summarizes the operational definitions of the variables used 
in this study following the common literature. 
2.1.7 Measuring Firm Performance  
This study also considered these performance indicators normally include profitability, efficiency, Size, leverage 
and liquidity. According to (Bourne, Franco, & Wilkes, 2003) a good performance measure must have broad 
base measure, Structured understanding of strategy, provide feedback and take actions on results. This study 
emphatically focused on those predominant measures that are important for the success of the various companies. 
In that regard, the study would measure the financial performance of firms using accounting based measures. 
Examples used commonly in the governance literature namely ROA and ROE (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012); (Abduh, 
Omar, & Duasa, 2011); and (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012)and EPS. 
 
3. Methodology 
Research design: In order to achieve the objectives of this study, the correlation study research design was used 
to investigate the relationship (namely board size, board composition and independence(non-executive directors), 
CEO duality, CEO tenure, firm size and leverage as independent variables and firm performance using Return on 
Asset, Return on Equity, Earnings per share as dependent variables. 
 
3.1 Data Collection and Procedure. 
In my research, I selected my sample from companies listed on the Ghana stock exchange. The total number of 
companies listed on the Ghana stock exchange are 42 as at 31 March 2018, I could collect unique data for (28) 
active Nonfinancial Companies representing 67% on the Ghana Stock Exchange covering a six year period from 
2012-2017.  Financial Companies such as banks and other financial institutions were also (14) represents 33% on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange totaling 42 companies. These companies have been excluded in this study owing to 
the differences in the regulatory requirements of the financial reports of the non-financial companies (Alsaeed, 
2006).  This study also employed secondary data to answer the research questions. The data was secondary 
collected from the annual reports of the selected companies that were on the Ghana Stock Exchange website. 
These annual reports includes; financial statements namely, Income statements, Cash flow statements, statement 
of changes in owner’s equity, Statement of financial position, statement of corporate Governance as well as from 
the director’s profile. The study used panel data framework which follows (Abor & Biekpe, 2007). It involves 
the pooling of observations on cross-sections of units over several time periods and it provided results that are 
not noticeable pure time-series in pure cross section or pure time series studies. Also firms that lack the 
independent variables` data are excluded and those lacking data for calculating the proxies for firm performance 
are also excluded. Hence, the final panel’s data are of 28 observations, by this way the real contents only are 
retained and this is useful to maintain data away from any distortion. 
 
3.2. The Proxy of Firm Performance  
From the prior empirical studies the most commonly used proxies to measure the firm performance are ROA, 
ROE, and EPS (Denis & Sarin, 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1998), (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003), (Ameer, Ramli, & Zakaria, 2010). All of thesis researches and many others used the same proxies for 
measuring performance. ROA is the accounting proxy for measuring performance. 
Table 1: Performance Variables and Their Descriptions 
Variable Definition Measurement Scale 
Firm Performance   
ROA Return on Asset Net Income as a percentage of total Assets 
ROE Return on Equity Net Income as a percentage of shareholder’s 
equity. 
EPS Earnings Per Share Net Income – Dividend on preferred stock 
            Average outstanding shares 
 
  
3.3. Independent Variables  
Independent variables are defined and shown in Table 2 Measurements and expected relations are 
consistent with prior research. 
  
Table 2: Measurements and Expected Relations 
Board   
Characteristics 
Definition Measurement Scale 
BOARD SIZE Board size Number of directors on the board 
COMPOSITION & Number of non-executive Proportion of non-executive directors sitting on 
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Role of CEO 
A binary that equal one if the CEO is Chairman of 




Number of years served. 
 
Number of years in the  position  
 
3.4 Table 3: Control Variables 
Control Variables Definition Measurement Scale 
SIZE (No. of employees) Firm size in terms of total assets 
owned 
Log of total assets 
 
LEVERAGE Leverage % The ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. 
 
4. 0 Data Analysis And Model Specification  
4.1. Data Analysis and Management 
Model Specification 
The relationship that is subject to investigation is firm performance as a function of board characteristics. The 
panel data analysis has been simply shown as: 
ROAit = β0 + β1 BSit + β2 BCMPit + β3 DULit+ β4 TENURE+ CTRLit + є  
ROA: RETURN ON ASSETS  
BS: BOARD SIZE  
BCMP: BOARD COMPOSITION  
DUL: CEO DUALITY  
TENURE: CEO TENURE 
CTRL: CONTROL VARIABLE (firm size and Leverage) 
And Error term. 
To ensure the robustness of the model and to reduce specification bias, the model includes control variables. 
Therefore, the model is restated as performance is a function of board structure and control variables. 
FIRMPFR=βit+ β (board structure) + K (Control factors) + ɛit. 
 
5. Result and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The main objective of this analysis is to measure the level of firm performance of the nonfinancial companies. 
The descriptive analysis study shows the average of firm performance and the averages of the other components 
of dependent and independent variables. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Of Panel Data: 2012-2017 
Summary Statistics (observations = 28) 
Variables  Mean   Std. Dev. Min.  Max. Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Performance Measures        
Return on Assets (0.62) 21.58 (91.64) 29.76 465.59 (2.13) 10.25  
Return on Equity 4.51 27.50 (70.81) 61.65 756.30 (0.56) 3.51  
 
Earnings per share (17.01) 109.83 (568.00) 232.00 12,062.00 (3.47) 20.07 
 
 
Board Factors        
 
Board Size  8.46 1.58 5.00 11.00 2.50 (1.33) 3.93 
Board Composition 4.14 1.83 2.00 8.00 3.36 1.09 3.30 
CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
CEO Tenure              2.57 1.79 0 
 
5.00 3.19 0.19 1.77 
 
Control Factors        
Firm Size  16.98 3.49 11.48 22.94 12.12 (0.18) 1.89 
 
Leverage 0.45 0.58 (0.79) 
 
1.87 0.34 (0.22) 
 
3.51 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the panel data for the period tested (2012 – 2017). On the average, 
most of the companies achieved return on asset of -0.6% with the maximum of -91.64% and minimum of 
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29.76% respectively. The mean value of the return on equity was 5%, maximum of 62% and minimum of -71%. 
In terms of EPS, the mean value was -17% meaning and minimum value -6% and a maximum value of 2%. The 
descriptive statistics for board size shows that the average number of board members is 8 members of the sample. 
It also shows the minimum number in the sample is 5 members and the maximum is 11 members. Moreover, the 
average percentage of the independent directors in the board of the checklist is 4.14%. However, the minimum 
percentage of independent directors in the board is 2% and the maximum is 8% of the board is independent 
directors. The average number of years that CEOs stays in office is 2.5 years this is up to a maximum of 5 years 
and minimum of less than 1 year. Besides, relating to the standard skewness statistics which shows the normality 
of data. The data to be normally distributed the standard skewness should be within the range ±1.96 (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). From table 4, it’s observed that board size, board composition, CEO duality and CEO tenure are 
normally distributed and within the range of standard skewness. 
 
5.2 Correlation Analysis 
 This analysis is done as an initial step in the statistical modeling to determine the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. Prior to carrying out the multiple regression analysis, a correlation matrix 
was developed to analyze the relationship that exit between the independent variables as this will help in 
developing a prediction multiple models which will reveal no relationship in cases where the value of the 
correlation is 0. On the other hand, a correlation of ±1.0 means there is a perfect positive or negative relationship 
(Hair, 2010). The values are interpreted between 0 (no relationship) and 1 (perfect relationship). Also, the 
relationship is considered small when r = ±0.1 to ±0.29, while the relationship is considered medium when r = 
±0.30 to ±0.49, and when r is ±0.50 and above, the relationship can be considered strong. Table 5 below reveals 
the correlation between board size, board composition, CEO duality, CEO tenure, firm size and leverage with 
firm performance (ROA), (ROE) and EPS  
Table 5: Correlation of variables 
Performance 









Perf. 1.00                  
Earnings per 
share 0.96 1.00                
Return on 
Assets 0.46 0.23 1.00               
Return on 
Equity 0.75 0.57 0.56 1.00             
 
Board 
Factors                    
Board Size  0.17 0.19 -0.04 0.08 1.00          
Board 
Composition 0.11 0.01 0.58 -0.08 -0.02 1.00         
CEO Duality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
CEO Tenure 0.02 
-
0.09 0.34 0.12 -0.49 -0.33 0.00 1.00     
Control 
Factors                     
Firm Size  0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.16 -0.17 -0.36 0.00 0.66 1.00   
Leverage 0.09 0.09 -0.17 0.20 0.08 0.34 0.00 0.14 -0.08 1.00 
****P<0.01 
****P<0.05 
Table 5 shows the correlation between firm performance, governance variables and the control variables.  
These findings reveal that Board size is negatively correlated (r = -0.04, p<0.05) with ROA but significant at the 
0.05 level of significance. Moreover, there is also a Board compositions positive correlation (r= 0.58, p<0.01) 
with ROA at level of significance. However, CEO tenure is positively correlated (r=0.34, P<0.01) but not 
significant at 0.01. The firm size is also positively correlated (r=0.12, P>0.05) with ROA, whiles leverage is 
negatively correlated (r= -0.17, P>0.05) and CEO duality has no relationship and it’s insignificant. To sum up, it 
is evidenced from above that, three variables namely, Board composition, CEO tenure and firm size have a 
positive correlation with ROA. In contrast, two variables, board size, and leverage have a negative correlation 
with ROA whiles CEO duality has no correlation with ROA. 
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5. 3 Hypothesis Testing, Results and Discussions  
In order to test the hypothesis of the study, the multiple linear regression analysis was adopted using the firm’s 
financial performance (ROA), ROE and EPS as dependents and Board characteristic comprising board size, 
board composition, CEO duality and Tenure as independent variables and the firm size and leverage as control 
variables. The result of the regression was posted in Table 6. Based on the regression the model meaning that, at 
least one of the variables is a significant determinant of the firm performance (F value= 15.403, p<0.001). 
Besides, the variables included in the model were to explain % of the variance in the ROA, ROE and EPS as 
shown by the adjusted by R2indicator. These results also indicate that 57% of the variance in the ROA, ROE and 
EPS might be explained by other factors which were not included in the model. 
Table 6: The Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis 
Performance 
Measures Coefficients Z P>|z| 
Earnings per share 1.0001 1068.22 0.000 
Return on Assets 0.9984 162.41 0.000 
Return on Equity 1.0016 208.92 0.000 
 
Board Factors    
Board Size  0.6927 4.86 0.000 
Board Composition 2.0039 7.31 0.000 
CEO Duality 0.00 0.00 0.000 
CEO Tenure 1.5581 12.40 0.000 
 
Control Factors    
Firm Size  0.9267 25.40 0.000 
Leverage 0.0000 0 0.000 
_Cons -4.1365 -3.32 0.001 
 
 
Based on the result in Table 6, board size was found to have a positively significant effect on firm 
performance at the 0.05 level of significance (β= 0.6927, z= 4.86, p<0.000) which is consistent with the 
hypothesis predicted. Therefore, the hypothesis (H1) is accepted. This result suggests that larger boards are 
better than smaller boards, therefore the larger the board the better the performance of the company. This 
position is established on the assumption that larger boards are created with members with different skills and 
professional expertise from different backgrounds. This facilitates a better decision making and places the board 
in the better position to monitor the activities of management. This is support of  (Rechner & Dalton, 1991) who 
reported that large boards are associated with stronger performance. These results supported the conclusion made 
by (Pfeffer, 1972) and (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) regarding the relationship between the board size and firm 
performance. A negative effect supports the findings of Shirk (2008) and Jessen 1993. This is also consistent 
with the agency theory perspective that a smaller board is related to better firm performance (Gertner and Kaplan, 
1996; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Sanda et al, 2005, Denis and Sarin, 1999). However, due to 
management costs and free rider problems inherent in large boards, shareholder groups generally favor smaller 
boards and have pressured companies to reduce board size (Gertner & Kaplan, 1996).  Similarly, the board 
composition was also found to have a positively impact on firm performance (β= 2.0039, Z= 7.31, p<0.000) at 
the 0.000 level of significance. This means that, the hypothesis formulated (H2) is accepted. Therefore, this is 
supported by (John & Senbet, 1998)(Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997), (Abor & Adjasi, 2007), (Khan & Awan, 
2012) argued that a board is seen to be more independent if it has more non-executive directors.  They all found 
is a positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Also (Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh, & 
Rudkin, 2010) documented that firms with independent directors have less agency problems and have more 
alignments to shareholders. Again, there was no relation between CEO duality and firm performance. CEO 
duality has no relationship with firm performance. Therefore, I reject the H3.This means that, the only way to 
maintain the CEO position is performance. Following the same reasoning, CEO tenure was also found to have a 
positive impact on firm performance at the 0.000 level of significance (β=1.5581, Z=12.40, p<0.000).The 
statistical results provide a support for the hypothesisH4 regarding the relationship between CEO tenure and firm 
performance.  I therefore accept the hypothesis H4. This result indicates that the longer period the CEO spends 
in his position the better the firm performance. This is because if the job security of the CEO is guaranteed then 
he/she would be prepared to take capital investment decisions that would have long-term effect on performance. 
It is also important that the board adopt a comprehensive approach in evaluating the performance of the CEO so 
that they do not concentrate only on the short term earnings of the firm but must look into the future the benefits 
the firm is likely to derive from decisions taken. 
While the firm size was not a significant predictor of the firm performance (β= 0.9267, z= 25.4, p>0.1), the 
leverage was found to have no significant predictor of the firm performance at the 0.1 level of significance (β= 
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0.000, Z=0.00, p<0.1). 
 
6. Conclusion  
The main objective of this research work was to examine the impact of board structure on firm performance 
evidence from the nonfinancial listed companies on Ghana stock exchange upon the firm performance; 
Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis was utilized. The correlation analysis results regarding the 
relationships between the corporate governance variables, control variables and the firm performance displayed 
in Table 6. Generally, the results show that board structure as corporate governance mechanism; board size, 
Board composition, CEO tenure all has a positive correlation with firm performance. The findings show that 
nonfinancial companies must have the right board size which is highly independent from the management of the 
company and with the appropriate expertise and skills. This would ensure that the board is well diversified and 
have the competence to give the strategic direction of the company. 
Furthermore, the result is an indication that the nonfinancial companies are well positioned to support the 
Ghanaian economic growth and development. With Good corporate governance records, these nonfinancial 
companies would be able to generate more resources to create more employment opportunities, pay dividend to 
shareholders and generate more tax revenue to government. Again, through efficient management of their 
financial resources, they would be able to support the growth of investment in the economy through their 
financial intermediation role by channeling resources to the critical areas of the economy. 
However, the study could not investigate other corporate governance characteristics due to data constraints. 
Therefore important factors such as Audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, CEOs 
remuneration, disclosure and frequency of board meetings among others could not be included. Again, since 
only twenty eight (28) companies studied are listed on the stock exchange, I could not use market performance 
measures. Furthermore, the performance of a company is influenced by more factors than just Board structure as 
a good corporate governance mechanism. Issues of social, legal, economic and the political environment are 
equally important. It is therefore suggested that future research should consider some of these factors in 
exploring the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
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